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When thinking of ideology, one tends to conceive it as a configuration of a strategic and convergent set of ideas. However, the argument of this paper is founded on the premise that, while a given ideology is supposed to be fed from a clearly identifiable and convergent set of causes and principles, in reality it is often rooted in seemingly divergent and even antagonistic ideas, which can, moreover, take on different guises within the same context. In other words, from such a perspective, ideology is defined as a body of ideas that, against the common sense understanding, strategically harbors seemingly opposing ideas that can supplement each other in particular ways. Iran, particularly since the 1979 revolution, is a prime example of a country where the state's ideology has been nourished by explicitly divergent ideologies. Specifically, Iran is a nation where the state's theocratic political ideology sometimes goes hand in hand with her plea for a return to her former Persian identity -an unwelcome identity from the point of view of the post-revolutionary state -to provide a basis for unity in the fight against an external other.
An interesting recent development in which the seemingly anti-state idea of a return to the Persian identity showed its consolidating role in relation to state ideology can be observed in the reaction of the Iranian Islamic state and its society to the threat of Islamic State (ISIS). While, for the Iranian Shia government, ISIS is considered a serious enemy embodying radical Sunnism, for those Iranians who emphasize their Persian identity ISIS precisely represents a menace to this pre-Islamic national identity. The question that can be raised here concerns the mechanism through which two seemingly opposed sources feed a unified ideology. To put it another way, what is the specific feature of each ideological cause that enables each to supplement the other?
To answer the above question, one needs, before analyzing the ideological apparatus itself, to explain the complexity to which the convergence of the two ideological causes gives rise. This complexity can be explained with reference to the fact that the Iranian Islamic State has not adopted a clear standpoint with regards to the notion of Persian heritage and identity. This equivocal attitude of the state is perhaps affected by the fact that it realizes that a notable number of Iranians, particularly among the middle-class, still believe Persian heritage to be an essential source that can give a unique dimension to their identity -a belief reminiscent of an ancient and powerful civilization with, moreover, a sophisticated system of government and values. Hence, the Iranian state is not willing to unequivocally refuse a traditional concept of Persian identity. At the same time, the state has no alternative but to put emphasis on its Islamic principles rather than on its Persian heritage, as this is what, according to the post-revolutionary leaders, distinguishes its value system from that of the prerevolutionary state and also from the East (socialism) and the West (capitalism) (Golnar, 1990) . However, as will be discussed later, this ambivalent attitude toward Persian identity is skewed towards a more or less positive positioning in response to its encounter with a threatening other (at the current moment, that of ISIS), which is a menace to both the Shia value system and the Persian heritage.
Our justification for juxtaposing religion and classical literature as a supplementary combination is that the two entities contain idiosyncratic features that can turn out to consolidate a single ideology. If the premise is, as Reilly (1981, p. 13) remarks, that ''ideology is not a selection of doctrinaire statements'', hence confirming the elasticity of ideology, it would then be necessary to explain how a given ideology ''grips'' its subjects (in the Ž ižekian sense of the word) without necessarily imposing itself via a coercive gesture. Here it can be argued that, in the case of the ideology adopted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the apparently rigid religious doctrine of the state needs to be supplemented by a more porous discourse capable of bestowing a necessary degree of flexibility on the state's overall ideology. Moriarty (2006) remarks that ''vagueness'' and ''flexibility'' are essential aspects of an ideology, as these features help to ''unite'' its constitutive elements through both ''abstract notions'', as developed in discursive structures, and ''actual social behaviour'' (p. 54). The latter point, as Moriarty indicates, is realized through both linguistic mechanisms and fantasmatic relations. According to this view, treating a literary text as an ideological entity is useful ''in the first place wherever the text itself thematizes social relationships or imaginary social relationships; where it contains characters who imagine and live their world in social terms'' (p. 54). The relationship between ideology, literature and the social imaginary will be discussed further in the analysis section. To address the question posed above, this paper employs a Lacanian psychoanalytic approach to the question of ideology, as developed by such thinkers as Ž ižek, McGowan, Glynos and Stavrakakis, to deal with the issue of ideology within the postrevolutionary context of Iran.
The fabric of the political culture of Iran has been approached by such scholars as Jahanbegloo (2012) , who believes that Iranian civil society has adopted a distinct, though not necessarily oppositional, path from that of the state. From this perspective, in Iran today there is a moral and ethical call on behalf of a peacefully-minded society that ''represents an alternative sphere of citizenship which holds a promise of individual autonomy beyond the political and religious sectarian attitudes'' (p. ix). Such an approach, which views Iranian civil society as demanding serious consideration for the rights of its citizens, rather than its civilians merely being viewed as ''part of a society organized on a theological-political basis'' (p. ix), is tenable in terms of the importance it gives to the role of the individual voices of Iranian society. Yet it tends to imply that civil society does not share any interest with the state at any level (e.g. social, cultural, political and economic). In contrast to the above approaches, the argument of this paper is that, first of all, the critique of ideology is still a highly effective way to provide an explanation of how, in a country like Iran, state and nation can have somewhat similar -if apparently opposing -interests that converge in particular circumstances to invigorate and shape an overarching ideological structure. In other words, the very civil society that seeks to follow a different path from that of the state's ideological apparatus is liable to (unintentionally) consolidate the same ideology through a revivalist national agenda that has its roots in classical literature (a phenomenon not limited to Iran). What this suggests is that the question of identity in Iran is of a complex nature and does not admit of a ''top-down'' analysis, hence demanding a multiperspectival approach.
Crisis of Identity in Iran
Whenever the question of Iranian identity is raised, a common word that crops up is crisis. Indeed, the whole history of contemporary Iran can be conceived of as the history of struggle over identities (Ashraf, 1993) . According to Ashraf, recent debates have focused on the epistemological aspect of Iranian identity, i.e., the question of ''true'' Iranian identity. Should Iranian identity be defined by those nationalistic ideas that highlight the influence of Persian civilization before the advent of Islam in the country? Or should it be explained by a mixture of Persian culture and Islamic principles? Debate has been heated as antagonistic narratives of Iranian identity have competed with each other, culminating in the 1979 revolution in which a theocratic (Islamic) state overthrew its predecessor and was celebrated as the state of God, while the Shah's regime, which had sought to build its legitimacy upon 2500 years of Persian civilization, was re-positioned as the embodiment of evil (Bashiriyeh, 1984) . However, considerable energy and effort notwithstanding, the theocratic regime has not been successful in establishing a ''pure'' Islamic identity for Iranian society. In this regard, as Ashraf (1993) points out, the preoccupation of the Iranian state and society with the question of identity ''reflects not only the recent origin and complexities of the concept, but also the crisis of national and ethnic identities in the post-revolutionary, post-Soviet era'' (p. 159). As such, the question of defining Iranian identity reflects a critical issue impinging on the state and civil society globally. Hillmann (1990) observes that Iranian literary history is like an arena in which two conflicting and contradictory approaches to sociology, religion, philosophy and aesthetics have been played out: the idolization of the old Zoroastrian worldview as against the relatively newer Islamic ideology based on Shia doctrine; a bittersweet, nostalgic-sceptical view of history in contrast to a fantasmatic allegiance to seeking definite answers to fundamental questions; an appreciation of individualism and independence in opposition to an embrace of collective identities in order to navigate dire straits, such as the Iran-Iraq war (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) and the current threat of ISIS.
The coexistence of contrasting identity narratives in Iran since the 1979 revolution raises a significant question: how is it possible that the state's ideology can be consolidated by narratives and discourses seemingly opposed to its causes? From a post-colonial perspective (e.g. Bhabha, 1994) , it can be argued that hybridity is an inevitable factor in contemporary life, an inalienable consequence of identity being constructed through an address to an other. In the case of Iran, it can be argued that both the state's emphasis on a Shia identity Fantasy, nostalgia and ideology and civil society's nostalgic attachment to a putative Persian identity are reactions to the four centuries of war (16th-19th) with the Ottoman Empire. From this perspective, the latter represents both Sunni Islam and the Arab other whose conquest of Persia in 651 led to the decline of the Zoroastrian religion in Iran. We see this historically inflected and hybridized reaction to an external other resuscitated in response to the emergence of ISIS as a contemporary representative of the radical Sunni and foreign/external other -with Turkey and Saudi Arabia representing additional, if less threatening, versions of this antagonistic other.
As the above analysis highlights, any identity is constructed in relation to some other and any study of Iranian identity needs to take into account both the ways in which Iranians think of their history and the complex relations of Iran both with the West (Ansari, 2014) and its neighbors, particularly Turks, Arabs and Mongols (Amanat, 2012, p. 3) . But, alongside this geo-political dimension of identity, Iranian classical literature provides a vital temporal anchor, as reflected in both the prominent place of literature on elementary, secondary and tertiary curricula in Iran and the significance of classical literature as represented in folkloric dimensions of Iranian identity.
A Lacanian Approach to Identity
Lacanian ideas have been fruitfully used by political and cultural theorists for more than two decades (e.g. Glynos, 2011; Stavrakakis, 2009) , in analyses of literary works and their implications for questions of ideology and gender in Iran (e.g. Talattof, 2011) and Lacanian studies of cinematic representations of modern Iranian society (e.g. Copjec, 2006; Erfani, 2012; Jö ttkandt and Copjec, 2009) . Nonetheless, it is useful to reiterate why and how Lacanian conceptualizations of identity and ideology offer unique insights into the question of the political.
According to Stavrakakis (1999) , the central concept in the Lacanian theory of subjectivity, which ''opens the way for a first confluence between Lacanian theory and political analysis'', is the idea of the subject as constituted by and through lack (p. 35). It is important to note that lack is not an entirely negative concept, as critics of psychoanalysis would have it, but can instead be thought of as an opening for creativity and change. As Ruti (2006) puts it, lack is the ''empty slot'' that allows for movement in the ''puzzle'' of life (p. 13). Indeed, this lack is the main incentive for the subject to establish an identity as part of a continuous process of imaginary and symbolic identification with the available resources in his/her environment. However, the important point to note here is that this identification process only temporarily fills the lack in the subject (Laclau, 1996, p. 21) . This is because the desire that arises as a result of lackitself a consequence of one's losing the ''lost object'' s/he never really had, as a result of our constitution as subjects upon entry into the symbolic order (McGowan, 2013) -continually latches onto a sequence of objects: the objet petit a, or small other, as object-cause of desire, identifying each as ''the real thing'' when the ''reality'' is that nothing is capable of staunching the interminable void at the core of our being. As Stavrakakis (1999) points out, it is precisely this evanescent nature of the identification process that makes it such a critical notion in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, as this temporality causes the reproduction of lack within subjective structure (p. 39). We might say that identification is ''an ambivalent and indeterminate'' process, accompanied by ''idealization and projection, incorporation and rejection, of the other'', as the subject attempts to eliminate lack, and consequently to form a substantive identity (an impossible endeavor), as part of an endless process (Laclau and Zac, 1994, p. 31; Duncan, 2013, p. 412) . This is precisely the place where the question of politics enters: ''The constitution of every (ultimately impossible) identity can be attempted only through processes of identification with socially available discursive constructions such as ideologies, etc.'' (Stavrakakis, 1999, p. 36, emphasis in original) . This brings us back to the question of ideology.
A Lacanian Approach to the Question of Ideology
Although Lacanian thinkers such as Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Ž ižek have contributed to rethinking critical political analysis through their meticulous and innovative application of Lacan's ideas to a range of contexts (Stavrakakis, 2007, p. 3), it is in relation to the field of ideological critique that their contribution has been most significant, through the conceptualization of ideology in terms of a ''constitutive lack'' whereby ''existence is constructed around the repression of a fundamental, unrepresentable and impossible negativity'' (Robinson, 2004, p. 259 ) that subjects attempt to fill by deploying fantasies. In particular, by re-inflecting fundamental political concepts such as ideology and hegemony in terms of Lacanian notions of lack and fantasy, Lacanian thinkers such as Ž ižek have developed an approach to political critique that, according to Glynos (2001) , ''goes beyond today's sophisticated accounts of how particular socio-political traditions have been contingently constituted' ' (p. 191) .
Specifically, Ž ižek does not confine the conception of ideology to the notions of false consciousness and misrecognition characterizing Marxist and Althusserian analysts of ideology respectively, instead adopting a distinctive ontological positions (Glynos, 2001) . As Glynos points out, whilst Ž ižek (here he also refers to Laclau) preserves the consequences of ''concrete meanings and sociohistorical specificity in ideological analysis'', he asserts that, so long as ideological analysis is restricted to such contextual evidence, we will fall short of achieving a comprehensive understanding of ideological mechanisms (p. 195) . Instead, Ž ižek gives priority to an analysis of ideology in terms of the enjoyment it offers subjects, in order to render palpable the ways through which ideologies ''grip'' their subjects and, as a result, have a hold on them. One of the key ways in which this occurs is through the operation of empty signifiers.
Empty Signifiers and the Impossibility of Closure
To understand the functions of ideology as theorized by Ž ižek, we should pay close attention to the idea of the ''illusion of closure'' and its role in providing a fantasmatic defense against the ''impossibility of closure''. Critically, rather than attempting to eliminate such negative connotations as ''illusion'' and ''misrecognition'' -notions commonly associated with Marxist framings of ideology -Ž ižek re-introduces them to define one of the characteristic features of ideology. But, while in the latter approaches ideologies are criticized for misrepresenting reality by hiding truth and presenting false knowledge in its place, a Lacanian approach involves ''non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the impossibility of any suture'' (Laclau, 2014, p. 125) or closure. In this sense, the denial of ideology's continued existence is the ideological exemplar par excellence (Ž ižek, 1989) .
This notion of the ''impossibility of closure'' and its relevance for defining a theory of ideology returns us to the Lacanian premise of society as ''constitutively lacking''. Thus, not only is the subject a subject of lack, but society is also theorized as impossible -not in Margaret Thatcher's individual-centered sense, but as necessarily lacking or incomplete. In fact, what society is lacking is ''an ultimate signifier that would render the socio-symbolic order complete'' (Glynos, 2001, p. 197) . However, as Glynos states, this very feature of society, in which its symbolic representations are always-already lacking, renders possible the ''politico-hegemonic struggle'' to fill this incompletion (p. 197) . But to fully understand the theory of ideology within a Lacanian conceptual framework, we need to elaborate another pivotal concept playing an essential role in the construction of identity: fantasy.
On the Function of Fantasy and its Relation to Ideology
For Ž ižek (1998), fantasy-construction is not carried out to ''obfuscate[s] the true horror of a situation''. Instead, its main purpose is to structure reality in such a way as to render it full, harmonious and complete. In particular, fantasy ''dictates the way in which the subject enjoys'' (McGowan, 2013, p. 217) and thus, as the locus of enjoyment, ''literally teaches us how to desire'' (Ž ižek, 2006, p. 47) . In other words, from such a perspective, fantasy not only is not degraded as an embodiment of hallucination, but is treated as ''an image set to work in the signifying structure'' (Lacan, 1966 (Lacan, /2006 .
To elaborate on this in more detail by conceiving fantasy as an effective element in the symbolic structure, Ž ižek (1997) argues that it can be thought of as ''a 'schema' according to which certain positive objects in reality can function as objects of desire, filling in the empty places opened up by the formal symbolic structure'' (p. 7). According to Ž ižek, the schematic nature of fantasy enables ''in the first place, the formulation of desire within the symbolic order and the establishment of some kind of identification within the empirical world of infinite possibilities'' (Daly, 1999, p. 233) . In other words, according to Ž ižek (1989), fantasy, by ''equating the subject to an object of fantasy'', provides him/ her with a possibility ''to obtain some contents, some kind of positive consistency, also outside the big other, the alienating symbolic network'' (p. 46).
It is here that the ideological aspect of fantasy becomes obvious. Fantasy renders the impossible society possible; but because society is ''actually'' impossible, this can only be achieved by creating an imaginary enemy that may be incarnated in different forms in different situations and held responsible for the non-realization of society (Koenigsberg, 2009) . In this way, the survival and completeness of a given society can only be achieved by eliminating the enemy. However, as Daly (1999) points out, for Ž ižek ''it is not simply that the presence of the other is preventing me (the subject) from being fully myself…because every identity is already inherently negated…This is why the Lacanian mark for the subject is $; a signifier designating the subject's auto-blockage'' (p. 224). According to Daly, in such an antagonistic relation the subject then ''attempts to externalize the immanent blockage by making the other… responsible for this blockage'' (p. 224).
The Iranian State and its Religious Ideology: Beatific and Horrific Fantasies
In order to function effectively, ideology relies on a fantasy construction to iron out the inconsistencies, contradictions and dislocations that are an inevitable aspect of social reality. Given that experience can never live up to this fantasmatically complete and harmonious version of reality, sustaining investment in the ideology necessarily relies on the creation of an (external) other who can carry the burden of blame for the inevitable non-realization of the idealized (but ontologically impossible) vision of society. In analyzing this fantasmatic dynamic, we can further identify two modalities that work together to sustain the ideology. The first can be described as a ''beatific'' mode, involving the positing of a state of harmony and completion, the realization of which the demonized other is preventing; the second is its necessary complement, a ''horrific'' mode, depicting the devastation and destruction that will ensue if the threatening other is not tackled (Glynos and Howarth, 2007) .
Informed by this reading of ideology, we will elaborate on the post-1979 Iranian state's ideological structure.
An essential characteristic of the ideological discourse employed by the Iranian state after the 1979 revolution is its multidimensionality, in the sense that this discourse simultaneously draws on political, mystical, spiritual, nationalistic and religious sources. It is precisely here, we believe, that the ideological function of fantasy-construction is critical. For instance, postrevolutionary Iran continually asserts the inseparability of religion and politics (Mavani, 2013) . More specifically, the religious Supreme Leader of Iran possesses the highest political status, so any and all important decisions must be made by him (and it is always a ''him''). Although this is not unusual in theocratic systems, the case of the Iranian Supreme Leader becomes special when one asks what makes the Supreme Leader different from other subjects. According to the constitution written after the 1979 revolution, the person who occupies the position of Iran's Supreme Leader is the ''Guardian Jurist'' (vali-efaqih). According to the theory of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (velayat-e-faqih) as delineated by the first leader of the 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Guardian Jurist is the person who is to lead the community when the Imam, the divinely inspired man, is absent (Algar, 1981) . In the view of Shia Islam, the religious basis of Iran's constitution, God bestowed the unique quality of divine knowledge upon the Prophet Muhammad and thirteen members of his family -known as the Fourteen Infallible -as a result of which they never committed an error (Ansariyan, 2007) and consequently enjoyed superiority over the rest of creation, and even the previous prophets (Algar, 1990) . Furthermore, according to Shia doctrine as adopted by the Iranian post-revolutionary state, the last member (Imam Mahdi) of this group is still alive, but living in ''The Occultation'' according to the will of God. Accordingly, the Mahdi, who has a Messianic character akin to that attributed in Christianity to Jesus Christ, will return to Earth before the Day of Judgment and distribute peace and justice, prior to which the earth remains afflicted by injustice and tyranny (Rizvi, 1999) . Critically, however, the Savior's coming is heralded by a number of signs, the most important of which are the widespread cruelty and injustice caused by evil and the predominance of ignorance and darkness over knowledge and brightness (Momen, 1985) , resulting in absolute chaos.
Here we see the beatific and horrific modes of fantasy working together. In other words, what the Iranian state asserts regarding the imminent catastrophe is immediately balanced by the promise of the Savior's coming, a Savior whose righteous successor is already (and conveniently) here among us in the form of the Supreme Leader. Indeed, the imminent catastrophe can be read as the ''radically ambiguous'' Lacanian Real that ''erupts in the form of a traumatic return, derailing the balance of our daily lives… at the same time [serving] as a support of this very balance'' (Ž ižek, 1991, p. 29).
Critically, although the horror of the threatened chaos is kept at bay by the beatific mechanisms performed by the promise of the coming Savior, ''at the same time it creates what it purports to conceal, namely its 'repressed' point of reference '' (Ž ižek, 1998, pp. 190-191) . This ever-present discourse of destruction and death serves to legitimate a regime of power as necessary for preventing the horrific scenario from materializing. In other words, the notion of a destructive enemy presented in the guise of a ''phobic object'' can be seen as playing a constitutive role that provides, in Feher-Gurewich's (1996) terms, ''a safety valve'' for the Iranian state (p. 29). Accordingly, the enemy in the Shia doctrine -which, conveniently, may be incarnated in many different formspermits the Iranian subject ''to find a point of reference in the outside world that prevents him from falling into the abyss of desubjectivation'' (p. 29).
The dynamic we have described can also be analyzed in terms of nostalgia and paranoia to demonstrate how a notion of enemy functions in political discourse. According to this analysis, these two states function in different ways: the nostalgic subject searches for the missing enjoyment in their own past, while the paranoiac subject blames the other as the one who has taken it. Therefore, for the paranoiac subject there is an external entity (threat) which prevents subject from ultimate enjoyment. For McGowan (2013), the paranoiac subject can adopt two attitudes towards the other. According to one attitude, the other has already stolen the privileged object and is enjoying what is originally mine. In the second attitude -which is relevant to the ideological discourse of the postrevolutionary Iranian state -the other has not yet stolen the ideal object, but s/he is cunningly planning to do so. In this way the paranoiac subject gains reassurance regarding the existence of the ultimate enjoyment, but only by assuming that there is always an enemy on the lookout to grab it ''despite its status as constitutively lost'' (p. 44). This analysis can be linked to the proclamation of the (Iranian) Shia clerics, according to which they believe that, under the banner of the successor (every person who is selected as the Supreme Leader) of the Savior (the Mahdi), the Muslim community has security and peace; however, all Muslims must perpetually be on their guard against the evil enemies seeking to disrupt this situation.
In this way, sustaining ideological belief and commitment is essentially bound to dynamics of fantasy and desire, for ''the essential kernel of fantasy is its capacity to organize desire, not to represent reality in a faithful way'' (Glynos, 2014, p. 183) . So long as this dynamic is maintained, it does not matter whether the subject's fantasy is realized in ''reality''. Thus, so long as the Iranian state is capable of providing its society with fantasmatic content and feeding its desire in order to maintain its jouissance, it need not be concerned whether people find any tangible trace of what they desire. From a psychoanalytic perspective, continually projecting the specter of an impending threat ironically serves to provide a source for jouissance, i.e. ''a kind of suffering through satisfaction, a kind of existential electricity that not only animates the subject but which also threatens to destroy him/her'' (Daly, 1999, p. 227 , emphasis added), or in Evans ' (1996) words, a ''painful pleasure' ' (p. 93) . In this way, the society's access to jouissance is ''not through the activity of acquiring the privileged object but through that of losing it '' (McGowan, 2013, p. 219) . It is precisely here that Iranian society shares its ideological orientation with the theocratic, post-revolutionary Iranian state. But, in order to grasp this fully, we need to examine the role of enjoyment within the dynamics of ideology.
Jouissance and Ideological Criticism
In Lacanian theory, our constitution as subjects of language involves a process of symbolic ''castration'' that redoubles the experience of alienation comprising imaginary identification in the mirror stage. As such, the subject is condemned to a lifelong quest in search of a purported ''lost'' object that it deems itself to have originally possessed, prior to its being ''cut'' by the word. Critically, ''the idea that the object was once possessed is strictly a retroactive fantasy -but an illusion that is inseparable from the symbolic order itself and does not cease to have effects, even when its nonexistence has been demonstrated'' (Shepherdson, 2008, p. 49) . Paradoxically, then, although the notion of a lost object is a postsymbolic phenomenon -for the ''subject'' as such did not exist prior to its subordination to the symbolic -it is also crucial that we recognize subjectification's ''ability to create the illusion that this object derives from an origin, that it somehow represents a past that was once possessed' ' (p. 49) . This explains why the alienated subject, in search of the lost object (jouissance), identifies with the other, thereby hoping to fill his/her lack. Yet this lifelong endeavor never leads to finding the lost object because ''the Other is lacking'' (p. 45). In fact, since the symbolic, like the subject, is characterized by absence and hence is by nature lacking, it can never provide the subject with what s/he desires. It is in such a situation that fantasy emerges and offers ''the promise of an encounter with this precious jouissance, an encounter that is fantasized as covering over lack in the Other and, consequently, as filling the lack in the subject'' (p. 45). According to Stavrakakis (1999) , this quest for lost/impossible enjoyment marks the human condition, and it is through the creation of fantasy that the subject is able to continue this constitutive quest.
To fully grasp this perspective, we need to recognize the power of jouissance and how it differs from everyday notions of pleasure. Critically for our discussion, while jouissance acts as a drive within the symbolic field, it is not limited to this field and consequently ''can never be fully captured by it'' (Shepherdson, 2008, p. 227) . Consequently, any discussion of jouissance must go beyond the realm of cognition, discourse and the symbolic because jouissance is an affective experience (Dashtipour, 2012, p. 56) . In this sense, it is ''a paradoxical enjoyment that cannot be fully represented in meaning, that is not made of meaning…but, nevertheless, does invest meaning and thus does make some sense'' (Stavrakakis, 2007, p. 71) .
In terms of a critique of ideology, this suggests the need for two complementary procedures. One is discursive or what Ž ižek (1989) calls ''the 'symptomal reading' of the ideological text'', whereby it is deconstructed to show how different ''floating signifiers'' are employed and then totalized through particular ''nodal points'', which ultimately leads to the realization of a particular reading of the text (p. 140). The other is an ideological critique that identifies ''the kernel of enjoyment'' in a given text to demonstrate how the embedded fantasy creates ''a pre-ideological enjoyment'' that is implied, manipulated and produced through an ideology (p. 140). In this way, jouissance, which has a ''non-sensical and pre-ideological kernel'' and acts as ''the last support of the ideological effect'' (p. 140), is taken account of in order to supplement ''the mechanisms of imaginary and symbolic identification'' (p. 139) in ideology critique. This brings us back to the issues of Iranian identities.
Ancient Literature as a Source of Ideology Construction
Epics centered on the (fantasmatic) lost glory of a nation are ubiquitous in human history (Honko, 1996) , their typical mixture of remembered glory and nostalgic loss commonly serving as the basis for constructing the bonds of national identity (Bellamy, 1992) . In the Iranian case, a key source is the Shahnameh (Book of Kings), widely regarded as ''the most iconic expression of Iranian nationhood'' (Omidsalar, 2011, p . 1) on the basis of the tenth century Persian poet Ferdowsi's narration of the mythical history of the so-called grand Persian Empire, which he concludes with its tragic conquest by Muslim Arabs.
The highly acclaimed Iranian film director, playwright, screenwriter and researcher Baharm Beyzaei (2013) describes the Shahnameh as ''a non-militant tool in the greatest Iranian cultural battle for survival'' and argues that Iranians have defined their identity by accepting or rejecting the vision it depicts. The central character or hero of this grand epic, akin to the works of Homer, magnificent in its literary language and replete with paradox, is Rostam. Symbolizing Persian dignity, Rostam treacherously kills his own son and then mourns his loss. Despite, or perhaps in part due to, its hyperbolic and melodramatic narrations, the Shahnameh enjoys a unique status among Iranians. Indeed, Iranian identity hinges upon an identification with its narration of their history, its purported authenticity making it an unrivalled source for social identity construction -though, of course, its saturation by nationalist rather than religious ideas generates an equal but opposite response from the current Iranian state (Rajaee, 2007) . Despite this opposition, as Ashraf (1993) states, the romantic portrayal of Iran presented in the Shahnameh has proved immensely resilient as a source of national identity construction and has Fantasy, nostalgia and ideology ''captured the hearts and minds of most middle-class Persians in the modern era and influenced all major brands of Iranian national identity, from monarchist to liberal-nationalist to religio-national'' (p. 161).
How does the romantic representation of Iran in the Shahnameh (un)intentionally supplement and consolidate the ideology as developed by the theocratic state? Recalling the paradoxes of the post-symbolic constitution of the lost object, it is important to note that, in striving to revive its national identity, a given society is actually also inventing it (Ž ižek, 2006, p. 29; see also Hobsbawm and Ranger, 2012) . Pursuing this reading further, it can be argued that Iranians enjoy the Shahnameh for the image it reflects back to them of a great and proud nation; their enjoyment derives, however, not from regaining this lost dignity, but by imagining and re-experiencing its loss. In fact, this is the only possible way that fantasy gives subjects a sense of enjoyment, by allowing them to imagine the loss of their ideal object. Such ''if only'' fantasies are an inseparable theme of religious motifs, literary productions and cultural rituals, characterizing individuals who are ''alienated from the present'' and ''lack interest in the future and constantly wring their hands over something in the past'' (Akhtar, 1996, p. 735) . One of the most tangible signs of ''if only'' fantasy, as Akhtar observes, is ''intense nostalgia'', involving the simultaneous experience of pain and joy, in which ''[p]ain is evoked by the awareness of separation from the now idealized object and joy by a fantasised reunion with it through reminiscences'' (p. 735). In fact, nostalgia achieves its unique power from this concomitant occurrence of seemingly contradictory feelings (Werman, 1977, p. 393) . Striving for ''a completely untroubled state'' as a panacea for current woes, the nostalgic individual, in his/her continuous pursuit of ''the lost object'', contrives an idealized, chimerical and romantic version of that object (Akhtar, 1996, p. 736) . Crucial to the maintenance of the ''if only'' fantasy, however, is that s/he who yearns may not possess what they yearn for, since ''the subject can…only enjoy the search and never the possession'' (Werman, 1977, p. 391) . Accordingly, the quest for the lost object must be so ''indefinite and indefinable'' that the subject never possesses it, since achieving the lost object would mean demythologizing it and the consequent death of the cause of the joy for the nostalgic subject. From a Lacanian point of view, the achievement of the lost object not only fails to fully satisfy the subject, but brings the subject into contact with the traumatic kernel of the Real.
The Iranian middle-class's craving to revive their national identity, particularly through resorting to classic national epics, can thus be interpreted as ''the attempt at all costs to avoid a more painful confrontation with some basic 'ontological truths' '' (Glynos, 2014, p. 181 ) and the key truth that the glory they strive to revive is just a figment of the imagination, a hyperbolic and unrealistic myth that is often called for by many nations to build up broader political projects, particularly in the face of an other. In the case of Iran, this other has been incarnated in a variety of entities: sometimes the Western world that positions Iran on the ''axis of evil'' and imposes sanctions upon her; sometimes Arab neighbors who want to play a more significant role in the oil market; and, most recently, in the form of ISIS. In such a situation, Iranians strive to revive their national identity, an identity rooted in the time when their nation purportedly enjoyed a glorious status. Key to this process, in which the subject staunchly strives to avoid confronting the bitter truth (that the lost glory might be merely a figment of the imagination) is first finding, albeit unconsciously, a symptom to embody a pure but paradoxically unrepresentable jouissance and then enjoying it (Fink, quoted in Glynos, 2014, p. 181) . In other words, the Iranian subject who believes in the national epic and sets it as a source of identification must inevitably accept that that glory be lost to avoid a more vexatious scenario: that there was no glory. This acceptance leads to a state of jouissance in which a less traumatic state takes the place of a more distressing one. As with the official Iranian state identity -which, as we saw, relies on the fantasmatic presence of a threatening external other -so too the identity of Iranian civil society rests on the fantasmatic foundation of a mythical past whose identificatory value is heightened by the threat posed in the present by those deemed to embody its antithesis.
A Marxian reading of ideology, as modified by Huaco (1973) , can shed light on the ideological function of literature. While Marx considers ideology within a framework that incorporates three factors, namely ''falsity, role and isomorphism'', Huaco replaces falsity with the ''analysis of mythical patterns'' so as to adapt the notion of ideology to that of literary critique (p. 423). In terms of its role, the Shahnameh can justify the ways through which a Persian is supposed to defend his/her identity at any cost (recall how Rostam, the hero and symbol of Persianness, kills his own son). The mythical patterns in this work contain features that set the ground for such a reaction by Rostam. However, a less explicit and yet more powerful aspect of the Shahnameh is its isomorphic element. Huaco states that isomorphic patterns hold sway when ''a social pattern produces its mirror image in some symbolic domain of culture'' (p. 422). Perhaps the best way to see the effects of the social pattern of the Shahnameh, as reflected symbolically across culture, is to look at the language of the dominant media in Iran: Farsi. There is no doubt Iranians ascribe unique credit to the Shahnameh as the work that saved their language after the country was attacked by different nations whose language was different. Moreover, as Huaco remarks, these three factors, separately or in combination, can contribute ''to the aesthetic unity and coherence shared by the (literary) works'' (p. 423). In the case of the Shahnameh, the combination of the three factors bestows a specific feature on the work that has made Iranians feel proud of the work for its use of ''pure'' Farsi. This notion of a pure Farsi is of such significance that the Islamic Republic of Iran supports an organization, the Academy of Persian Language and Literature, at the head of which is the Iranian President himself, who in turn appoints the Academy's president.
In terms of the ideological function of a work of literature, Potocco (2009) , comparing the Althusserian conception of ideology with that of Castoriadis (1997) , remarks how ''the (non-) realization of the ideological function within a text always depends on the social, extra-textual codes of interpretation, since ideology can only interpellate as a socio-historical force imposed on a text'' (p. 1). Such an approach to the functioning of ideology hinges heavily on the structure of the social imaginary that sets the ground for the subject (reader) of literature to identify with the extra-textual world. For Castoriadis, the imaginary significations of a society, acting as agents of the homogenization of a given society, provide that society with answers to its most fundamental and essential questions: ''Who are we as a collectivity? What are we for one another? Where and in what are we? What do we want; what do we desire; what are we lacking?'' (pp. 146-147). Castoriadis believes ''the role of imaginary significations is to provide an answer to these questions, an answer that, obviously, neither 'reality', nor 'rationality' can provide'' (p. 147). However, it should be noted that, for Castoriadis, ''the imaginary does not come from the image in the mirror or from the gaze of the other. Instead, the 'mirror' itself and its possibility, and the other as mirror, are the works of the imaginary, which is creation ex nihilo'' (p. 3). It is in this sense that Castoriadis conceives of ''reality'' and ''rationality'' as the result of the functioning of the social imaginary in a given society (p. 3). Accordingly, in order to give unity to members of society, ''the social imaginary must be interwoven with the symbolic'' (p. 131). This approach to the role of the imaginary is also reflected in Lacan (1981) , who states that, while the image that the child receives from the mirror in the mirror stage provides him/her with an illusory coherence and totality, this is a necessary and consequential illusion which plays a determining role in the child's entering the symbolic realm and hence has real effects on his/ her life.
Reading the ideological function of the epic literature in Iran from this perspective, we can see how the particular socio-historical situation in which Iran is situated provides the requisite ''social, extra-textual codes of interpretation''. These codes include the empowerment of Arab states, especially after the 1979 Islamic revolution; the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, which exacerbated tensions between Iran and the US; the positioning of Iran by the USA on the socalled ''axis of evil'' after 9/11; the subsequent imposition of all-encompassing sanctions on Iran; the threat of ISIS; and the tensions with Saudi Arabia over the lifting of some of the sanctions following Iran's nuclear negotiation with world powers. It is in this situation that the literary text achieves an ideological function and hence unites society around a central idea, namely, the revival of a once-glorious identity. However, in reality, what society under the effect of ideology achieves is not the revival of a formerly existing identity, but rather a recreation of that identity ex nihilo.
Conclusion
This paper has drawn on Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts to explore the complex and multi-dimensional structure of ideology within a country where the state's ideology is formed by ostensibly contrasting ideologies (i.e. the nationalistic myths of the society and religious foundations of the state). Our analysis has highlighted how ideology can harmonize different, even antagonistic, worldviews within a society when the latter is confronted by a looming threat such as that posed by so-called ISIS. Especially in the case of ISIS, an identification with Persian heritage as reflected in the Shahnameh seems to indicate that Iranians tend to (re)emphasize their national identity when the looming threat recalls the traumatic event that led to the fall of their lost glory. Specifically, this paper has shown how a seemingly unified ideology can harbor contrasting ideas that find unification via their shared reliance on the notion of a well-equipped and intelligent enemy, an (inside/outside) other who can be incarnated in different forms, including the West, other Sunni Arab formations, Israel and recently ISIS. This enemy, who threatens devastation, destruction and chaos, serves as the reference point for how the subject of the state's ideology comes to define himself/herself in relation to this other, hence providing an identificatory ground for the subject of the state. Such an ideology needs to promise its subjects that their search for the lost object, for what protects them against the traumatic kernel of the Real, is not futile, something it achieves by representing the desired object as previously possessed.
By supplying a glorified mythical past, a national epic such as the Shahnameh offers this imaginary lost object as a vehicle for jouissance, paradoxically providing a suitably grand identity by fantasizing its loss. Finally, a key issue concerns the difference between the jouissance the state sustains in the subject and that to which the classical literature gives rise. While the former mainly relies on the notion of absence (of the occluded Imam) and tries to assure the subject that, as long as there is a successor for the absent Imam (i.e. the Supreme Leader), s/he would be safe in the face of an imminent threat, the latter hinges on the absence or loss of a glory that can be recreated and hence remembered via reference to one of the few sources which affirms that glory: the Shahnameh.
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